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Based on a new economic geography (NEG) model by Puga (1999), we use the equilibrium 
wage equation to estimate two key structural model parameters for the NUTS II EU regions. 
These estimations enable us to come up with an empirically grounded free-ness of trade 
parameter. In line with NEG theory, the estimation results show that a spatial wage structure 
exists for the EU regions. By going back to the theoretical model we then analyze the 
implications of the free-ness of trade parameter for the degree of agglomeration. Our main 
findings suggest that agglomeration forces still have only a limited spatial reach in the EU. 
Agglomeration forces appear to be rather localized. At the same time, confronting our 
empirical results with the underlying new economic geography model also brings out the 
limitations of empirical research in new economic geography. 
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1. Introduction  
In his review of Fujita, Krugman and Venables (1999), but in fact of the whole New 
Economic Geography (NEG) literature, Neary (2001) reminds us that the real test for the 
NEG is to go beyond mere theory and to bring out its empirical and policy relevance. This 
paper addresses the empirical relevance of the NEG. In doing so, we take the basic message 
of Leamer and Levinsohn (1995, p.1341), “estimate don’t test” seriously. We will show the 
usefulness of the NEG, but we will not really test it against alternative theories, though we 
will control for fixed “1
st nature” endowments. We also take their second message seriously 
and that is “don’t treat theory too casually”. For this paper their advice means that our 
empirical analysis is well grounded in NEG theory and that, in turn, we will explicitly address 
the theoretical implications of the empirical findings. In doing so, we will have to face the 
difficulties that arise in NEG models when empirical findings are confronted with the 
underlying model. In this sense our paper is also about the (current) limitations of empirical 
research in NEG.    
 
Assessing the empirical relevance of NEG is not easy. It is well known that agglomeration 
patterns can be found at all levels of aggregation (country, region, city). But this does not 
necessarily imply that neo-classical theories of location are without merit. Geographical 
concentration of factor endowments or pure technological externalities could lead to 
agglomeration in neo-classical models. In the same vein, the absence of agglomeration does 
not imply that the NEG models are not relevant. NEG models are characterized by multiple 
equilibria, of which the symmetric or spreading equilibrium is one. In addition, one could 
point out that the application of these models to different economies with different (labour 
market) institutions (like the USA or the EU countries), or to different geographical scales 
(country versus city level) sits uneasy with the tendency in empirical NEG applications of a 
´one size fits all’ approach. Finally, from a more methodological angle, there are important 
questions about the (spatial) econometrics involved as well as about data measurement (see 
Combes and Overman, 2004). The conclusion is that the same empirical facts about 
agglomeration can be explained using different theoretical approaches. On the one hand this is 
good news, because it means that the facts are not in search of a theory. On the other hand it 
leaves unanswered the question as to the relevance of NEG and, within NEG, as to the 
  2relevance of specific NEG models. In recent theoretical work by Robert-Nicoud (2004) and 
Ottaviano and Robert-Nicoud (2004) this last issue is also stressed.   
 
In this paper we will address some of the above issues. More in particular, based on a seminal 
NEG model (Puga, 1999), we estimate the equilibrium wage equation. This procedure gives 
estimates of two key structural model parameters for our sample of the NUTS II EU regions, 
and it enables us to derive empirically based estimates for the so-called free-ness of trade 
parameter. In doing so we follow the suggestion by Head and Mayer (2004a, p. 2663), who 
state that for future NEG empirics to progress “it is critical to identify the free-ness of trade”. 
In our view the estimation of the wage equation and the implications for the free-ness of trade 
parameter for the sample of EU regions is already very useful. One of the 5 key predictions of 
NEG (Head and Mayer, 2004a) is that agglomeration raises factor prices and this is precisely 
what the estimation of the wage equation sets out to establish. But in this paper the estimation 
of the wage equation and its structural parameters is to some extent only a means to an end. 
Using our estimation results, we subsequently also try to find out what the estimations imply 
for the degree of agglomeration across the EU regions. To be able to do this, we have to 
confront our estimations with the underlying NEG model. Here, we are after a second of the 5 
key predictions of NEG that at some point a fall in trade costs, here an increase of the free-
ness of trade, will induce agglomeration. In order to be able to do this, we have to take the 
estimation results back to the theory. As we will show, by taking NEG empirics this one step 
further we will only be able to confront the free-ness of trade and the degree of agglomeration 
for the EU regions by making rather strong assumptions. In fact, this confrontation between 
NEG empirics and theory illustrates the limitations of NEG research in our view. 
Nevertheless, this additional step, from empirics back to NEG theory, is crucial in our view 
because in many ways the hallmark of NEG is the analysis of the impact of changes in the 
free-ness of trade on the degree of agglomeration, the latter being an endogenous variable.   
 
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 the basic model is briefly presented and the 
equilibrium wage equation is derived and this equation is the vehicle for our empirical 
analysis. In terms of long-run equilibria, section 3 describes two spatial allocations of 
economic activity that are consistent with this wage equation, but have different predictions as 
to what happens with the degree of agglomeration when the free-ness of trade increases. 
Section 4 presents our basic estimation results. The estimation of the equilibrium wage 
equation yields coefficients for the transport cost parameter and the substitution elasticity and 
  3thereby, for any given distance between a pair of regions, an estimate for the free-ness of 
trade parameter. The estimations show that a spatial wage structure exists for the EU regions. 
Subsequently, section 5 confronts the findings of section 4 with our benchmark model and 
here we discuss the implications of our findings for the degree of agglomeration for the EU 
regions. As it turns out, one is, however, only able to do so by making short cuts. By using 
bilateral country trade data, section 6 extends the analysis to the sector level. Finally, section 
7 concludes. Overall, and taking the limitations of our analysis into account, our main finding 
is that agglomeration forces do not extend very far. Agglomeration forces appear to be rather 
localized.     
2 The Model and the Wage Equation 
In this section we give a brief description of the Puga (1999) model and focus on the 
derivation of the equilibrium wage equation. The model we use encompasses the two most 
important NEG models: the Krugman (1991) model with inter-regional labor mobility, and 
the Krugman and Venables (1995) model without inter-regional labor mobility. The model 
without interregional labor mobility is considered to be more relevant in an international 
context, because it is a stylised fact that labor is internationally less mobile than 
intranationally. For the EU, however, it is not a priori clear if this is true in the long run. 
Economic integration could stimulate international labor mobility. We will now introduce and 
summarize the basic set-up of the Puga model (for more details see, besides Puga (1999), also 
Fujita, Krugman, and Venables (1999), Chapter 14). 
 
Demand 
Assume an economy with two sectors, a numéraire sector (H), and a Manufacturing (M) 
sector. As a short cut one often refers to H as the agricultural sector to indicate that this 
industry is tied to a specific location. Every consumer in the economy shares the same, Cobb-
Douglas, preferences for both types of commodities: 
) 1 ( δ δ − = H M U  
The parameter δ is the share of income spent on manufactured goods. M is a CES sub-utility 
function of many varieties. 
















Maximizing the sub-utility subject to the relevant income constraint, that is the part of income 
that is spent on manufactures, δE, gives the demand for each variety, j: 
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substitution, and E= income.  
 
Firms also use varieties from the M sector as intermediate inputs. Assuming that all varieties 
are necessary in the production process and that the elasticity of substitution is the same for 
firms as for consumers, we can use the same CES-aggregator function for producers as for 
consumers, with the same corresponding price index, I. Given spending on intermediates, we 
can derive demand functions for varieties of producers which are similar to those of 
consumers.  
Total demand for a variety, j,  can now be represented as: 
(3)  ,   Y I p c j j
1 − − =
ε ε
where Y is defined as  . The first term on the right hand side of Y comes from 
consumers, representing the share of income E that is spent on all M-varieties, the second 
term on the right hand side comes from firm demand for intermediate inputs, this is equal to 
the value of all varieties in a region, npx*, multiplied by the share of intermediates in the 
production process, μ (see below); x
* npx E Y μ δ + =
*  denotes the equilibrium supply of a manufacturing 
variety by a single firm, see below.   
 
Manufacturing Supply 
Next, turn to the supply side. Each variety, i, is produced according to the following cost 
function, C(xi): 
(4)    ) ( ) (
) 1 (
i i i x W I x C β α
μ μ + =
−
where the coefficients α and β describe, the fixed and marginal input requirement per variety. 
The input is a Cobb-Douglas composite of labor, with price (wages) W, and intermediates, 
represented by the price index I. Maximizing profits gives the familiar mark-up pricing rule 
(note that marginal costs consists of two elements, labor and intermediates): 
(5)  β
ε
μ μ ) 1 ( )
1
1 (
− = − W I pi ,  
Using the zero profit condition,  , and the mark-up pricing rule (5), 
gives the break- even supply of a variety i (each variety is produced by a single firm): 
) (
) 1 (
i i i i x W I x p β α
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−
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Equilibrium with transportation costs in the 2 region model 
Furthermore, transportation of manufactures is costly. Transportation costs T are so-called 
iceberg transportation costs: T12>1 units of the manufacturing good have to be shipped from 
region 1 to region 2 for one unit of the good to actually arrive in region 2. Assume, for 
illustration purposes, that the two regions - 1 and 2 - are the only regions. Total demand for a 
product from, for example region 1, now comes from two regions, 1 and 2. The consumers 
and firms in region 2 have to pay transportation costs on their imports. This leads to the 
following total demand for a variety produced in region 1: 
1
2 12 1 2
1
1 1 1 1 ) (
− − − − − + =
ε ε ε ε ε I T p Y I p Y x  
We already know that the break-even supply equals 
β
ε α ) 1 (
1
−
= x , equating this to total 
demand gives (note that the demand from region 2 is multiplied by T12 in order to compensate 
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Inserting the mark-up pricing rule, (5), in this last equation and solving for the wage rate gives 
the two-region version of the wage equation in the presence of intermediate demand for 
varieties.
2 This version of the NEG model is also known as the vertical linkages model, 
because this model introduces an extra agglomeration force: the location of firms has an 
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where the constant, Const, is a function of (fixed) model parameters. 
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2 The reason to derive a wage equation instead of a traditional equilibrium price equation is twofold. First, labor 
migration between regions is a function of (real) wages, second, data on regional wages are easier to obtain than 
regional manufacturing price data, see section 4. 
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and intermediate inputs), Is is the price index for manufactured goods, ε is the elasticity of 
substitution for manufactured goods and Trs are the iceberg transport costs between regions r 
and s. Note that when we want to estimate wage equation (7) for our sample of NUTSII EU 
regions we need to come up with a specification of the transport costs Trs , this will be done in 
section 4. In particular we will have to answer the question how transport costs vary with the 
distance between regions. In the short-run, when the spatial distribution of firms and labor is 
fixed, the model reduces to three equations with three unknowns (wages W, expenditures Y, 
and the price index I). In the long-run the spatial distribution of economic activity is 
endogenous because then footloose firms and, depending on the particular version of the 
model used, manufacturing workers can move between regions or sectors. This mobility and 
hence the endogenous location choice are really the key feature of NEG.    
 
Equation (7) closely resembles the “old-fashioned” market potential function. Regional wages 
are higher in regions that have easy access to high-wage regions nearby. This is reflected by 
the term ∑YTrs 
(1-ε), known as nominal market access (Redding and Venables, 2004). Wages 
are also higher when there is less competition, this is the extent of competition effect, 
measured by the price index Is. Note, that the price index Is does not measure a competition 
effect in the sense in which this term is normally used (price are fixed mark-ups over marginal 
costs and there is no strategic interaction between firms). A low price index reflects that many 
varieties are produced in nearby regions and are therefore not subject to high transportation 
costs, this reduces the level of demand for local manufacturing varieties. Since firms’ output 
level and price mark-up are fixed, this has to be off set by lower wages. Hence, a low (high) 
price index Is depresses (stimulates) regional wages Wr. The inclusion of the price index in the 
market access term in the wage equation is important since it makes clear that we are dealing 
with real market access (RMA) as opposed to the market potential function where typically 
only nominal market access matters.  
 
Finally, the term I
-μ/(1-μ)  in wage equation (7), is known as supplier access, SA (Redding and 
Venables, 2004). A lower value of I, lowers production costs and allows a higher break-even 
wage level. Supplier access means that when the price index is low (high), intermediate input-
supplying firms are relatively close (far) to your location of production, which strengthens 
(weakens) agglomeration. A better supplier access (a lower value of I) lowers wage costs. 
This effect is stronger the larger the share of intermediate products, μ, in the production 
  7process.  Note that with μ=0 (no intermediate inputs) only the real market access term is left 
in the wage equation.  
  
Wage equation (7) will do for our empirical purposes.
3 In the short-run when the spatial 
distribution of firms and workers is fixed, demand differences between regions will be fully 
reflected in regional wage differences. Or, in other words, regional differences in real market 
access, RMA, and supplier access, SA, (both of which are fixed in the short run) will result in 
regional wage differences. In the long run when firms and workers can move, these 
differences will also give rise to re-location of firms and workers (which amounts to saying 
that in the long run RMA and SA are endogenous).
4 All that matters for our empirical 
analysis in section 4 is that wage equation (7) is the equilibrium wage equation and that it can 
be estimated. However, it will trun out in section 5 that to learn more about the relationship 
between economic integration and agglomeration, the wage equation will not do and we have 
to address the nature of the long-run equilibria. 
3 The relation between economic integration and agglomeration 
5
Interregional Labor Mobility: the Tomahawk 
NEG models that have the same set-up as Puga (1999) predict that with interregional labor 
mobility economic integration will lead to complete agglomeration of the footloose agents in 
the end. The intuition behind this is simple and is illustrated for the two region case in Figure 
1. Economic integration implies lower transportation costs. In Figure 1 this is a movement 
from left to right along the horizontal axis, from low to high values for φ. The parameter φ is 
called the free-ness of trade or “phi-ness” of trade parameter (Baldwin et al, 2003) and, in 
terms of our model, is defined as φrs≡Trs 
1-ε It is easy to interpret: φrs =0 denotes autarky and 
the absence of economic integration whereas φrs =1 denotes free trade and full economic 
integration between regions r and s. In empirical work this gives an extra degree of freedom: 
one has to choose a functional form for Trs. The vertical axis in Figure 1 shows the share of 
                                                 
3 This has an additional advantage in that we do not have to consider the long-run adjustment mechanism, that is, 
whether or not firms are mobile or instead labor (see Puga, 1999, p. 310). 
4 Whether or not in the long run both prices (here, wages) and quantities (here, mobile firms and workers) act as 
adjustment mechanism, depends on the inter-sector elasticity of manufacturing labour supply (see Head and 
Mayer, 2004b). With an infinite elastic labour supply all the adjustment has to come from the quantity side (and 
there will be no regional wage differences). In case, as we will assume too, of a postively sloped labour supply 
function w.r.t. the relative (=manufacturing/agricultural) wage, at least part of the adjustment will come through 
regional wages, see the next section for an analysis of this issue. In section 5 (see Figure 3) we will return to this 
topic of price versus quantity adjustment.       
5 Our discussion in this section is based on the 2 core NEG models as discussed in Puga (1999), but compare 
also Fujita, Krugman and Venables (1999), Chapters 4 and 5 with Chapter 14.  
  8the footloose labor and hence the degree of agglomeration in region 1. Figure 1 gives the well 
known Tomahawk figure that results from NEG models, like Krugman (1991), with 
interregional labour mobility and it shows how changes in free-ness of trade might change the 
degree of agglomeration.  
 
Figure 1 The tomahawk 
 



































workers to agglomerate in either region 1 or 2 is indicated by φ
B, the so-called break point
the point where the symmetric equilibrium (degree of agglomeration = ½ ) is no longer a 
stable equilibrium (indicated by the dashed horizontal line). At this point the re-location 
decision of a worker means that others will follow, triggering a process of agglomeration
Analysing the effects of increasing economic integration on agglomeration is now reduced 
the question where an economy is located on the horizontal axis in Figure 1, that is, one is 
interested in whether or not an economy is in actual fact to the left or to right of φ
B.
6  
Puga (1999, eq. 16) derives the following analytical solution for the break-point for the
region case (dropping subscripts r and s):   
 
6 For the purpose of this paper the sustain point, φ
S is deemed not relevant under the assumption that we are only 
interested in the case where we move from less to more economic integration, that is, we only move from left to 
right along the horizontal axis in Figure 1. The characteristics of break and sustain points are analysed in detail 
by, for example, Neary (2001), Robert-Nicoud (2004) and Ottaviano and Robert-Nicoud (2004). 
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We introduce equation (8) because it will be used in sections 5 and 6. The elasticity η is the 
elasticity of a region’s labor supply from the H-sector to the manufacturing sector. If η = 0, no 
inter-sector labor mobility is possible, if η = ∞ there is perfect labor mobility between sectors, 
that is to say the inter-sector labor supply elasticity is infinite. In the latter case wages in the 
manufacturing sector and the H-sector are identical until a region becomes specialized in 
manufactures. If 0 < η < ∞ migration from the H-sector to the manufacturing sector can be 
consistent with a wage increase in both sectors. The inclusion of an upward sloping labor 
supply function thus implies that the model is more general than Krugman (1991, where η = 
0), or Krugman and Venables (1995, where η = ∞). Most importantly, if 0 < η < ∞, the bang-
bang long run solutions as in Tomahawk model might disappear once we do no longer allow 
for inter-regional labor mobility. This is briefly discussed next. 
   
No interregional labor mobility: the Bell-Shaped Curve 
How relevant is the Tomahawk Figure for the analysis of EU integration and agglomeration? 
In international trade theory it is standard to assume that labour is mobile between sectors, but 
not across national borders. This assumption reflects the stylised fact that labour is less mobile 
across borders than within countries. Without interregional labour mobility agglomeration, 
however, is still possible (see Krugman and Venables, 1995). Firms may find it advantageous 
to agglomerate because of intermediate input linkages, they want to be near the suppliers of 
these inputs, recall the discussion about the supplier access term in wage equation (7) from 
the previous section. The manufacturing labor required to sustain the agglomeration of firms 
comes from the immobile H sector. To persuade workers to move from the H-sector to the 
manufacturing sector, each firm has to offer workers in this sector a higher wage than the 
existing wage in this sector: the more inelastic labour supply is to manufacturing wages, the 
higher this wage offer has to be. Agglomeration in this class of NEG models, and opposed to 
the case where the Tomahawk Figure applies, is associated with increasing wage differences 
between regions. In the peripheral region, wages decrease, because once firms agglomerate in 
the more attractive region, labor that is released in the manufacturing sector, increases labour 
supply in the agricultural sector. The point to emphasize here is that an upward sloping labour 
supply function (with 0<η<∞), agglomeration drives up wages in the core region. This 
  10ultimately reduces the incentive for firms in the manufacturing sector to concentrate 
production in the region where manufacturing economic activity is agglomerated for a 
number of reasons.  
Without interregional labor mobility the long-run relationship between the free-ness of trade 
(economic integration) and agglomeration might look like Figure 2 which has aptly been 
called the bell shaped curve by Head and Mayer (2004a).
7  As in Figure 1, for the 2 region 
case we have φ on the horizontal axis and the degree of agglomeration on the vertical axis. 
For low degrees of economic integration (to the left of φ
B
low ) we have spreading and similar 
to the previous section, once economic integration passes the break-point (here φ
B
low) a 
process of agglomeration starts. The main difference with the previous model, is that 
agglomeration can be partial and go along with interregional wage differences. If economic 
integration is pushed far enough, a second(!) break point, denoted φ
B
high, will be reached. 
From φ
B
high onwards we have re-newed spreading, no agglomeration is left whatsoever and 
interregional wages will now be equal (because both regions will have the same number of 
manufacturing firms and an equally sized manufacturing sector). 































                                                 
7 It might but it need not, this depends on the exact parameter configuration, see the Appendix in Puga (1999) or 
Robert-Nicoud (2004). The point to emphasize is that what really distinguishes Figure 2 from Figure 1 is that 
once agglomeration has arrived the economy will stay in the agglomeration regime in Figure 1as economic 
integration increases further whereas in Figure 2 for high levels of economic integration (high levels of φ) 
agglomeration will turn into (renewed) spreading. Here we assume that the latter possibility occurs with 
  11 




high are the (real) solutions to the quadratic equation in φ (Puga, 
1999, equation (33)): 
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As with equation (8), equation (9) will be used in sections 5 and 6. If, depending on the exact 
parameter configuration for ε,γ, μ and η, these solutions exist, this expression gives us the two 
break-points. To follow Head and Mayer (2004a) we would like to answer the question for the 
case of the EU regions “where in the bell are we?” Finally, and this must be emphasized, 
since the difference between the two classes of NEG models (Figure 1 versus Figure 2) only 
comes to the fore when we are dealing with long-run equilibria, the equilibrium wage 
equation (7) is at home in both classes of NEG models.         
4. The estimation of the wage equation 
Before we can estimate wage equation (7) we have to take the following issues into account. 
First, we have to specify the distance function. We considered two options: 
•  Trs=T
Drs, where the transports costs Trs increase exponentially with the distance 
between r and s, and T represents the transport cost parameter that does not vary 
with distance  (applied by Hanson, 2001, Brakman, Garretsen, and Schramm, 2004) 
•  Trs=TDrs
γ , where the parameters  T, γ > 0 (Crozet, 2004). The size of the distance 
decay parameter γ needs to be estimated and the data will decide whether transport 
costs rise or fall more or less than proportionally with increased distance between r 
and s. If  0 < γ < 1 transport costs rise less than proportionally with distance, and 
reflects that economies to scale (or distance) are possible with respect to 
transportation.  
We opted for the second possibility because in that case the data decide whether transport 
costs rise or fall more or less than proportionally with increased distance between r and s. 
Also, from a theoretical point of view, the second option is to be preferred (McCann, 2005). 
The distance variable Drs will be measured in km. between NUTSII regions. The distance from 
a region r to itself, Drr  can be modelled in several ways. For internal distance we use the 
                                                                                                                                                          
“smooth”, that is, partial agglomeration, equilibria like depicted in Figure 2 but one can also come up with a 
double tomahawk (Robert-Nicoud, 2004, p. 22-23) to depict this second possibility.      
  12proxy 0.667 
π
area
 in which area is the size of region r in km
2, (see Head and Mayer, 2000 
for a discussion of this measure for internal distance). Given our specification for Trs we can 
calculate φrs ≡Trs
1-ε , for each combination of Drs and Drr once we have estimates for ε and γ. 
 
A second issue that we need to address is that we cannot estimate equilibrium wage equation 
(7) directly. There are no (sufficient) regional price index data for NUTSII regions and this 
means that Ir cannot be measured as such. In addition, even if we somehow get around 
measuring the regional price indices, the equilibrium price index is itself a function of the 
regional wages Wr.  As can already be guessed from equation (2), the equilibrium price index 
in region r is also not only a function of wages in other regions but also of the price index in 
other regions. This follows directly from the fact that in the model with intermediate inputs 
firms there are 2 inputs (labor and manufacturing goods). This “price index” problem can be 
solved in two ways. First, as for instance shown by Hanson (2001), one could try to make use 
of other equilibrium conditions to get rid of the price index altogether. This has its drawbacks 
too. For the case of the EU regions this would lead to new data requirements that cannot 
(easily) be met.  Also, this strategy may imply, as it does in Hanson (2001), that one needs 
additional assumptions that are troublesome for the present analysis (in particular that 
interregional real wages are always equalized which clearly too strong an assumption to make 
for the case of the EU regions). We can, however, by expressing the price index in region r as 
an average of the wage in region r and the wages in centre regions corrected for the distance 
between region r and these centre regions solve this problem (see Brakman, Garretsen and 




As a third and final issue, we observe that regional wages across Europe may differ for 
reasons that have nothing to do with the demand and cost linkages from the NEG literature. 
This leads us to another issue that needs to be addressed. Human capital externalities or (pure) 
technological externalities might also give rise to a spatial wage structure. These externalities 
imply that regions may simply differ in terms of their marginal labour productivity. 
Introducing labour productivity as an additional explanatory variable in the wage equation 
                                                 
8 Another solution to be able to estimate the wage equation if data on the price index I  are lacking is to simply 
assume that Ir=Is . This assumption (see Niebuhr, 2004 for an example) effectively boils down to stating that 
only nominal market access matters, which is not relevant for our case.    
  13would, however, probably not be very useful. Regional wages would then be a function of 
regional labour productivity and these 2 variables are clearly connected: regional labour 
productivity is an endogenous variable. Instead, we opted for an estimation strategy of the 
wage equation where wages are function of the RMA and SA terms of equation (7) only 
expect for the inclusion of truly fixed, hence exogenous controls. The physical and political 
geography of Europe are therefore also taken into account in explaining regional wage 
differences (Combes and Overman, 2004).  
 
The possibility that the physical geography (climate, elevation, access to waterways etc.) or 
the political geography (borders, country-specific institutional wage arrangements etc.) might 
also explain regional wage differences was taken into account as follows. As proxies for 
physical geography we will use for the NUTSII regions the mean annual sunshine radiation (in 
kWH/m
2) and the mean elevation above sea level. We will also use dummy variables when a 
region borders the sea, has direct access to (navigable) waterways, or is a border region. To 
capture the possibility of country-specific determinants of wages (like the centralisation of 
wage setting) we also use country-dummies as control variables. The physical and political 
geography variables capture the fixed features of the economic geography that may have a 
bearing on regional wages. By fixed we mean that these variables are not determined by the 
location decisions of mobile firms or workers.
9            
 
The log-transformation of the equilibrium wage equation gives the specification that, see 
wage equation below, actually has been used as the central wage equation in our estimations, 
and by adding physical and political geography control variables we thus end up with: 
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 in which area is the 
size of region r in km
2 ;  and Zi  = set of additional control variables for each region that 
potentially consists of mean annual sunshine; mean elevation above sea-level; and dummy 
variables (country dummy, border-region dummy, access to sea dummy, access to navigable 
waterway dummy), for more information on the data used and the definition of variables see 
the Appendix
                                                 
9 This is why we decided not use the regional production structure as control variable. In NEG models this is 
clearly an endogenous variable. In the end NEG models are all about the simultaneous determination of   demand 
and production across regions. 
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What is immediately apparent from the wage equation is that the supplier access (SA) term is 
correlated with the real market access (RMA) term. The multicollinearity between RMA and 
SA is discussed at length by Redding and Venables (2004) and Knaap (2004). It leads these 
authors to opt for either SA or RMA in the actual estimations. We follow these authors and 
opt thereby for RMA.  In our case the lack of data on regional price indices makes this choice 
rather straightforward! In some of our estimations we have, following Redding and Venables 
(2004), experimented with including the distance of each region to the economic centers as an 
(time-invariant) approximation for supplier access, this did, however, not affect our main 
results. Implicitly we will assume that in our estimations SA is constant (it may vary over 
time but not between regions).  
 
In addition, there are other econometric issues to be addressed like the endogeneity of the 
variables (income) that make up the real market access term (Hanson, 2001, Mion, 2003). We 
have estimated wage equation (7’) in levels and also, without the time-invariant control 
variables, in 1
st differences, and, following Hanson (2001), experimented with measuring the 
RMA term at a higher level of aggregation (NUTSI) than wages (NUTSII). In doing so, we 
have also performed IV-estimations and used both non-linear least squares (NLS) and 
weighted least squares (WLS). In particular, when estimating in levels, the Glejser test 
indicated the presence heteroscedasticity so we choose WLS.  
 
The sample period is 1992-2000.  Our goal is not solve all these econometrical issues since 
the estimation of the wage equation is to some extent only a means to an end in this paper. 
The means is to arrive at “reasonable” estimates for the substitution elasticity ε and the 
distance parameter γ so as to be able to infer the free-ness of trade parameter. Table 1 gives 
the results of estimating equation (7’) in levels, where income Ys is for NUTSI regions. To 
further deal with the ever-present problem of endogeneity in NEG estimations, we 
instrumented income too.  Table 1 gives the WLS results of estimating (7’) where the 
estimation is the second stage of a 2SLS regression where in the first stage regression income 
was regressed upon its initial level in 1991, a country specific time trend, country dummies 
and a border dummy. This is a simple way to instrument income.  
 
   
  15Table 1 Estimating Wage Equation (7’) for the EU regions, 1992-2000  
 coefficient  t-statistic 
Substitution elasticity  ε   3.85  9.09 
Distance parameter      γ 0.34  9.18 
Constant -0.62  4.23 
Dummy border regions  -0.015  2.25 
Dummy river regions  -0.03  2.57 
Sunshine -0.05  6.60 
Dummy coastal regions  0.01  1.97 
Elevation 0.0005  5.48 
t-values for 2SLS have been corrected for the fact that fitted values from the first stage 
regression are included in the second stage; Number of obs.: 1566;  
13 country dummies were also included (not shown here) and with the exception of Denmark 
and Finland were all significant.  
 
 
The coefficient for the substitution elasticity ε is in line with other studies (indicating relative 
strong weak economies of scale), see for instance Broda and Weinstein, 2004 for sector 
evidence for the USA or Hanson and Xiang, 2004 for recent international evidence. The 
estimation results for the distance coefficient imply that γ < 1 which indicates that transport 
costs increases less than proportionally with distance. Also note, that the fixed controls 
perform quite well, they are significant and have mostly the expected sign. The estimation 
results support the idea of a spatial wage structure: wages fall the further one moves away 
from economic centres. A better real market access, the RMA-term in wage equation (7’), 
imply higher wages in region r. The prediction from NEG models like Puga (1999) that 
agglomeration leads to higher factor prices in the centre-regions is thus confirmed by the 
estimation results in Table 1. When we estimated wage equation (7’) for each individual year 
for our sample period 1992-2000 we also found a spatial wage structure. Moreover, the 
estimation results for the two key parameters (ε and γ) for each year were such that the 
implied free-ness of trade did not really change between 1992 and 2000. The 1990s are for the 
EU a period associated with increasing economic integration but thus does not show up in an 
increase of the free-ness of trade parameter over time. 
 
The fact that we find a spatial wage structure runs counter to those NEG models where wages 
between regions are equalized because of an infinitely elastic labour supply, see section 2. 
With an infinitely elastic labour supply adjustment between centre and peripheral regions 
takes place (in the long run) through movements of firms and workers only, which implies 
  16equalization of RMA across regions (Head and Mayer, 2004b, p. 8).
10 This observation will 
used in the next section, see Figure 3. Finally, as indicated before, the estimation of the 
coefficients for ε and γ enables us to put a number on the free-ness of trade parameter:  rs φ .  
The finding that a spatial wage structure exists for the EU regions is important in its own right 
but, as stated in the introduction of the paper, we want to go beyond the estimation of the 
wage equation and also address what these kind of estimations mean for the relationship 
between economic integration and agglomeration. This relationship is at the heart of NEG 
theory. In order to be able to do this, we need to go back to the underlying theoretical model 
as introduced in sections 2 and 3. In doing so, we take the estimates of Table 1 as our 
empirical benchmark, ε=3.85 and γ=0.34.
11  
5 Free-ness of Trade and Agglomeration: The Bumpy Road from 
Empirics back Theory 
 
To analyze the implications of (changes in) the free-ness of trade for (changes) in the degree 
of agglomeration, the mere estimation of the wage equation as such is clearly not sufficient. 
To be able to analyze these implications with our equilibrium wage equation, this equation 
should be able to allow for the degree of agglomeration to change when key parameters like 
the free-ness of trade change. In the wage equation the degree of agglomeration or the spatial 
distribution of economic activity shows up in the real market access (and supplier access) 
term. The level of real market access RMA for region r depends crucially on the share of the 
footloose firms and workers that are located in region r itself and in nearby regions. In 
estimating the wage equation we have taken RMA and thus implicitly the degree of 
agglomeration as given. Ultimately, the hallmark of NEG (see Ottaviano and Thisse, 2004) is, 
however, that the location of footloose firms and factors of production is endogenous. For the 
RMA term this means that in the long run real market access, and the regional demand 
differences which it reflects, cannot be taken as given. In particular, neither income Ys nor the 
price index Is can be considered to be fixed in the long run from a NEG perspective. Ideally, 
we would like to be able for the case n (=1….s) EU regions to analytically derive what the 
                                                 
10 Inspection of wage equation (4.42) in Fujita, Krugman, and Venables (1999) immediately reveals that in 
principle both elements are important: wage as well as employment (here, RMA) adjustments.  
11 As explained above, the inclusion of both the supplier access (SA) term and the real market access (RMA) 
term in our estimation of (7’) is troublesome a priori, because of the expected degree of multicollinearity 
between SA and RMA. Because of lack of data we cannot directly compute SA but we can approximate the price 
index Ir for each region by filling the estimated values for γ  and  ε  and, not based on estimations, μ (0.3). If we 
confront the resulting SA (Ir
μ/(1-μ) ) with the RMA (the ∑ term in (7’)) we indeed find a high degree of 
correlation.    
  17relationship between the free-ness of trade and the degree of agglomeration. And in doing so 
we would like to allow both factor prices and factor movements to function as adjustment 
mechanisms to determine the equilibrium spatial allocation across regions.
12 At present, NEG 
simply is not able to do this for the case of more than 2 regions.   
 
In terms of our wage equation, a first option would be to assume that either mobile workers 
and hence the RMA term or wages do all of the adjustment (Head and Mayer, 2004b and 
Fujita et al, 1999, Chapter 4). The former is for instance assumed in home market effect 
studies (Davis and Weinstein, 1999), with the result that regional wages do not differ. 
Whereas the latter boils to down to assuming that RMA is exogenous, that is the location of 
firms and workers is given. In our view both of these extreme options are not very appealing 
for our present purposes since in reality one may expect that the equilibrium spatial allocation 
is the result of both price and quantity adjustments. In important contributions to the empirics 
of NEG, Redding and Venables (2004) and Head and Mayer (2004b) for instance estimate an 
equivalent of wage equation (7’) and assume that wages do all of the adjustment keeping the 
RMA (and SA) term fixed. Our estimation results in Table 1 do indeed lend support to a 
spatial wage structure and thereby the idea that real market access and supplier access are 
higher in or near centre regions. Based on Head and Mayer (2004b, their Figure 2) for our 
sample of EU regions, it is indeed the case that the RMA term is higher for regions that are 
close the centre of the EU, see the top panel of Figure 3. The top panel shows for each EU 
region the real market access (fitted values based on Table 1 for 1992 data) and the distance 
of the region to the NUTSII region of Limburg in Belgium which is the most central region in 
our EU sample. It is clear that RMA is higher for regions that are closer the centre of the EU. 
At the same time, however, the data and our estimation results for the EU regions indicate, see 
the bottom panel of Figure 3, that the spatial distribution of RMA is not constant over time 
indicating that the degree of agglomeration cannot be taken as fixed a priori. During the 
period 1992-2000 some regions experienced quite a substantial change in their RMA. To be 
clear on this, this is not a criticism of Head and Mayer (2004b) or Redding and Venables 
(2004) since they are not concerned with the question as to how the degree of agglomeration 
might change when key model parameters change, but it merely points out that their strategy 
will not do for our purposes.   
 
                                                 
12 Or in model terms, we would like to take equation (4.42) in Fujita, Krugman, and Venables (1999) seriously.  
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When we want to investigate the relationship between the free-ness of trade and the degree of 
agglomeration, we thus must go back to NEG models that allow both RMA and hence the 
degree of agglomeration to be endogenous and to be subject to change to when the free-ness 
of trade changes. And this is, of course, precisely what the NEG models like Puga (1999) set 
out to do, recall Figures 1 and 2. But if we do so a different problem arises. We would like to 
confront the empirically grounded estimate of the free-ness of trade with the analytical break 
points from of section 3 so as to be able to say where, given the free-ness of trade estimate, 
the various EU regions are on the Tomahawk or Bell Shaped curve depending on which of 
these 2 core NEG models versions is preferred. Below, following inter alia Crozet (2004), we 
will show the results of this thought experiment. But this analytical clarity has its price, 
analytical solutions like the break-point conditions (8) and (9) have only been derived in a 
meaningful sense for a 2 region model. This strategy thus creates a problem when, as is the 
case here, the sample consists of many regions.
13 To tackle this problem, we will also address 
the relationship between our empirically grounded free-ness of trade and the degree of 
agglomeration using numerical simulations based on (a version) of the NEG model that 
includes all NUTSII regions while, in line with our estimations of the wage equation, 
controlling for the actual geography of Europe.    
 
Before we turn to these multi-region simulations, we will first restrict ourselves to our NEG 
model where for the case of 2 regions the break-points φ
B can be derived from equations (8) 
and (9). In order to be able to infer for any pair of regions r and s with bilateral distance Drs 
the implied value for the free-ness of trade parameter φrs based on our estimates for γ and ε, 
we have to take into consideration that the NUTSII regions are not of equal size and that 
therefore the internal distance Drr matters to assess the free-ness of trade between a region r 
and any other region s. This is why the associated value of φrs is in fact a measure of relative 
distance Drs/Drr and thereby of relative transport costs Trs/Trr.  
 
We dub the break-point φ
B
labmob for the version of the NEG model with interregional labor 
mobility, see equation (8). Given certain restrictions on the model parameters (see Puga 
(1999), p.315), this break-point gives us the critical value of φ below which the symmetric 
equilibrium (no agglomeration) is locally stable. If, however, φ> φ
B
labmob we have complete 
                                                 
13 In section 6, we use bilateral sector trade data for various country pairs to answer the same question.      
  20agglomeration just like Figure 1 illustrates. Note, however, that due to presence of internal 
distance we thus have to adjust the definition of φ
B as follows, that is we have to define the 
free-ness of trade in terms of relative distance Drs/Drr (see Crozet, 2004, p. 454 for a similar 
approach) and this holds for the break points in both the model with and without interregional 
labor mobility:  













































The break-condition (8) is not affected by our particular definition of the free-ness of trade 
parameter as given in equation (10), and this is also true for the break-condition (9). For the 





high denote the 1
st and 2
nd breakpoint in Figure 2). From equation (9) it 




high do as such not depend on the 
specification of the transport costs function. Given, see equations (8) and (9), parameter 
values for μ,η,δ and ε, we can arrive at a specific value for the various break points φ
B. If we 
then use this in equation (10) and also substitute estimates for ε and γ, we know the threshold 





 that corresponds with the break point. Comparing this 
threshold with the actual relative distance between regions r and s provides information as to 
the spatial reach of agglomeration forces for any pair of regions r and s: if we position 
ourselves in region r we want to know at what distance a region s still falls within the 
agglomeration reach of region r. It is important to keep in mind that we conduct this thought 
experiment under the stringent and crucial assumption that we are dealing with a 2 region 
world! For regional policy makers this thought experiment might be important as they are 
often interested in the position of their region versus the rest of the world. In the last part of 
this section we will drop this assumption when we turn to our multi-region simulations.                       
 
To be able to confront our estimation results with the break-point conditions (8) and (9), while 
taking into account the definition of the free-ness of trade as given by equation (10), we thus 
finally need some benchmark numbers for the parameters μ,η,δ  (given that we already have 
an estimate for ε). For the first three parameters we simply follow Puga (1999) and Head and 
Mayer (2004a) and use as our benchmark values μ=0.3,η=200, δ=0.1.  It is important to keep 
in mind that the conclusions are of course sensitive to the choice of parameter values. 
  21Generally speaking it is true in both versions of the NEG model of sections 2 and 3 that the 
range of values of φ for which the symmetric equilibrium is stable shrinks and, conversely, 
for which (partial) agglomeration is stable expands whenever, ceteris paribus, μ,η,or δ get 
larger and/or ε gets smaller (see also Puga, 1999, eq. 18). Given these benchmark values and 
break-conditions (8) and (9), we thus arrive at values for the 3 break-points. From equations 
(8) and (9) we get thus values for the 3 break points φ
B
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φ . Given our estimates from Table 1 for the distance parameter γ (0.34) 
and the substitution elasticity ε (3.85) we finally arrive at the hypothetical relative distance 
that corresponds with the break point. 
 
The results of this experiment imply that the agglomeration does not extend further than a few 
times the internal distance of a region. To see this, note that the average internal distance for 
the NUTSII regions is 42 km. With this value for internal distance Drr we get from the 
perspective of region r a “critical” or threshold external distance Drs  for the model underlying 
the bell-shaped curve of about 200 km. for φ
B
low and 100 km. for φ
B
high. This means that for 
any actual Drs>200 km we are in Figure 2 to the left of the first break-point where spreading 
rules (the average distance between a pair of NUTS II regions is 620 km). Along similar lines, 
it is only when the actual Drs<100 km. that spreading rules again. In between, that is for 100 
km<Drs<200 km, we are on the part of Figure 2 with (partial) agglomeration. For the 
Tomahawk model the range or radius of agglomeration forces is somewhat stronger but still 
rather limited if one considers the fact that the distance between any pair of economic centres 
for the case of the EU NUTSII regions is thus often much larger than 161 km.
14   
 
To put our results based on this 2 region thought experiment into perspective, in the Appendix 
we estimate a simple market potential function to get some idea about what the centre regions 
are in our sample of EU+ regions. We list 39 regions with the highest market potential (we 
stopped when London entered the list). This is, of course, rather ad-hoc but it nevertheless 
gives an indication. For these 39 centre regions, the average distance to each other is 309 km. 
(of these regions, the region Limburg in Belgium, see also Figure 3, has the lowest average 
distance to the other 38 regions: 220 km.). Set against our thought experiment, these distances 
                                                 
14 Our third conclusion is in line with the findings by Crozet (2004, Table 6). He conducts a similar analysis the 
major difference being that the break point analysis is limited to the Krugman (1991) model (the break condition 
(8) with μ=η=0) and the fact that Crozet estimates his model for 5 EU countries (for each country separately).    
  22imply that on average agglomeration forces emanating from a centre region r are too small or 
weak to affect other centre regions. Another way to illustrate our results is to take one 
particular region like the “most central” region, Limburg in Belgium (with Drr=18.5 km.), or 
the region with highest market potential, Nordrhein Westfalen in Germany (with Drr=69.4 
km.), and to calculate for these individual regions their threshold distance Drs. Also for these 2 
regions the spatial strength of agglomeration forces is such that only a limited number of the 
other 38 regions are affected. For the core NEG model (Krugman, 1991) we can use equation 
(8) with μ=η=0 and here we find, compared to other NEG models nested by Puga (1999) that 
the corresponding break point is reached for relatively low values of Drs, that is to say for the 
Krugman 1991 model the agglomeration forces and based on our estimations the critical 
external distance below which we are in the agglomeration part of the Tomahawk is about 100 
km. We will use this result (that agglomeration occurs relatively (!) easy in the Krugman 1991 
model) to opt for the Krugman 1991 model in our multi-region simulations below.       
 
To understand what we do and do not want to claim, it is important to be clear as to what we 
have done so far in our attempt to go back from empirics to NEG theory. For our sample of 
NUTSII regions, we estimated the wage equation (7’) and this helps us to arrive at the free-
ness of trade parameter for any region r with distances Drs and Drr. Once we do this we can 
derive region-specific free-ness of trade parameters. The NEG theory (the Tomahawk and 
Bell Shaped curve) gives us the break-points, but only for the case of 2 regions. Solutions for 
these break points for the case of n>2 only exist for the case where distance is normalized 
(this is an innocent assumption to make as long as n=2 but clearly not when n>2 because it 
means assuming equidistant regions). 
15 Using our estimates for the substitution elasticity and 
the distance parameter from Table 1 we can calculate the implied threshold distances between 
regions r and s at which a break point occurs. Or in other words, our experiment "indicates 
how far the agglomeration forces emanating from a region extend across space" (Crozet, 
                                                 
15 Suppose that we stick to the assumption of equidistant regions for n>2, then it can be shown (Puga, 1999, 
Appendix), that the number of regions (n) enters the break conditions (8) and (9) as an additional parameter. For 
a large number of regions, like our sample of NUTS II regions, the result is that when n increases φ
B ≈0, which 
means that the corresponding threshold distance Drs also approaches zero km. This would mean that for any real 
distance Drs between any pair of regions we are always in the agglomeration regime. Symmetry is no longer 
viable (which is not very surprising in the sense that symmetry, every region having exactly a share of 1/n of the 
footloose production, is a rather stringent condition when n is large). Besides, it is not clear how to call an 
equilibrium in which n-1 regions have the same share of the manufacturing production but the n
th region is 
larger: is this symmetry or agglomeration? Most importantly, however, the underlying assumption of equidistant 
regions is hard to maintain for n>2 to start with. If one wants to analyse the long run equilibria and the associated 
break points for n>2 regions, analytical solutions do not exist and one has to restore to simulations which also 
has clear drawbacks.    
  232004, p. 454). For a region r with an internal distance of Drr , we arrive at the threshold 
distance Drs at which the balance between agglomerating and spreading forces changes sign. 
We thereby establish for any region r for both NEG models the radius (measured by Drs) 
within which agglomeration or spreading forces dominate.  
 
The above experiment, though interesting in our view, has a severe shortcoming. It confronts 
the empirics of a multi-region EU with the analytics of the 2 region model. An alternative 
approach would be to confront our estimation from Table 1 with a NEG model for n regions, 
where n is the number of NUTSII regions. The difficulty with such a strategy is that we have 
to rely on simulations since no analytical solutions thus exist (or make sense) for the break-
points in case of n>2 regions. To illustrate such a simulation exercise we use the methodology 
of Stelder (2005) who applied the Krugman (1991) model to the regions of Europe.
16 The 
essence of this method is that it uses the actual geography of Europe and calculates the 
shortest distance between grid points on the map of Europe (in our case the grid consists of 
the NUTSII regions in our sample). In this way one is able to deal with mountains, seas, 
islands etc. Physical obstacles like these increase the distance between NUTSII regions. 
Applying this non-neutral space simulation experiment to Krugman (1991) has a number of 
advantages in our view. First, in wage equation we use the physical geography of Europe as a 
control variable and we are able to do the same with our simulations. The use of the actual 
geography of Europe also means that our simulations are more “realistic” than for instance the 
well-known (12 region) race track simulations or seamless world analysis in Fujita, Krugman 
and Venables (1999, see chapters 6 and 17 respectively). Our simulation experiment includes 
all NUTSII regions. The reason to use the Krugman (1991) NEG model is also grounded on 
the fact, see above, that the previous experiment suggested that, if anything, for this model 
agglomeration forces are relatively strong.      
 
Starting with the initial distribution of regional gross value added across the regions and given 
our preferred estimates of γ and ε, one can simulate the long-run equilibrium situation in 
Europe, that is, an outcome where real wages across regions are equalized. Figure 4 below 
shows the outcome of such a simulation exercise (gross value added for the European regions 
                                                 
16 See Brakman, Garretsen and van Marrewijk (2001), pp. 171-174, for a brief explanation of this simulation 
method, see Stelder (2005) for more details. The distance between 2 locations is calculated as the shortest path, 
on the assumption that each location on the grid is connected with its direct and horizontal and vertical 
neighbours with distance 1 and with diagonal neighbours with distance √2. Non-neutral space is then introduced 
by making “holes” in the grid.     
  24is normalized to 1, regions where activity is concentrated are darker compared to more 
peripheral regions). 
 
Figure 4. Agglomeration in Europe in Multi-Region Model 
             
    A = initial distribution        B = final distribution 
 
Figure 4A depicts the initial (here, 1992) distribution. Darker areas thus denote that such a 
region has a relatively larger share of European gross value added. Agglomerations are to be 
found roughly along the lines of the so called European banana ranging from London to 
Belgium and the south part of the Netherlands via west and south-west Germany to northern 
Italy, the central position of Paris is also noteworthy. Based on our parameter estimations 
Figure 4B calculates the long run equilibrium for the European region to which the initial, 
1992 distribution would give rise based on our estimations of the free-ness of trade. When 
compared to the initial distribution, the region around Paris and the region around Milan are 
for instance able to attract more economic activity. The same holds for other initially larger 
regions. In general, when comparing Figure 4A and 4B, core regions gain at the expense of 
nearby regions. This is in line with our previous finding that the reach of agglomeration is 
limited in space. Overall, when comparing these Figures 4A and 4B, and notwithstanding 
some re-distribution, the long run equilibrium does, however, not look very different from the 
initial situation. In particular, the long run equilibrium is not one in which the European 
regions have collapsed into a strong core-periphery pattern whereby one or just a few regions 
have attracted all of the economic activity. To investigate this further, we have also simulated 
long-run equilibria for larger values of the free-ness of trade than those implied by our 
estimations for the substitution elasticity and the distance parameter in Table 1, see Figure 4C 
for just one example. These additional simulations reinforce the above conclusions. Larger 
regions increase in economic importance and smaller regions in the vicinity of those larger 
  25regions lose out. But also for increased values of the free-ness of trade, the overall equilibrium 
distribution remains rather similar to the one shown in Figure 4B. 
 
To sum up, following the estimation of the equilibrium wage equation in the previous section 
we started this section by asking if this wage equation could be used to learn more about the 
equilibrium spatial distribution of economic activity, in particular as to the relationship 
between the free-ness of trade and the degree of agglomeration. It turned out that that merely 
sticking to the wage equation would not do for our purposes. We had to go back to our NEG 
model where the degree of agglomeration and hence the locations of footloose firms and 
workers is allowed to change when key parameters like the free-ness of trade change. Sticking 
to the 2 region model has the advantage that our estimation results can be confronted with 
analytical solutions as to whether and how the free-ness of trade impact on the degree of 
agglomeration. When doing so, agglomeration appears to be a rather localized phenomenon 
for the European regions. Though interesting in our view, in the end we must dismiss this 
strategy of linking the empirics of the NUTS II regions with the 2 region NEG model for the 
basic difficulty of analysing the case of multiple regions by means of 2 region model. It is 
therefore that we ultimately have to rely on multi-region simulations.      
6 Bilateral country trade flows and sector φ’s  
Our estimations and the subsequent analysis in section 5 are based on aggregate data for each 
NUTSII region. That is to say, we did not use regional data on the distribution of wages, 
valued added or other variables for the various sectors in a region. The reason is simply that 
these data are not available at the NUTS II level. In order to arrive at an “educated guess” 
what the free-ness of trade parameter could look like for various manufacturing sectors for the 
EU and as a complement to our analysis in sections 4 and 5, we follow Head and Mayer 
(2004a). They explain that the free-ness of trade parameter can be approximated through the 
use of bilateral trade and production data. These data are available at the country level (and, 
not at the EU regional level). Based on Head and Ries (2001), they define a very simple 
estimator for the free-ness of trade parameter which can be derived from any basic NEG 
model: 






  26where the numerator denotes the imports of country i from country j and vice versa; the 
denominator denotes for both country i and country j the value of all shipments of a industry 
minus the sum of shipments to all other countries (Head and Mayer, 2004a, p. 2618) 
If the bilateral trade between these 2 countries is relatively important (unimportant), φtrade is 
relativey high (low): 0<φtrade<1. The advantage of this “estimator” for the free-ness of trade 
parameter is that no actual estimations are required. Head and Mayer calculate φtrade for 21 
industries and two country pairs (Canada/USA and France/Germany) for 1995 and then 
confront their implied free-ness of trade parameter with industry-specific bell curves. These 
are derived by plugging in industry-specific values for the respective parameters in the break 
condition (9).
17 The main result is that, almost without exception, for each of the 21 industries 
φtrade is rather low (in the range of 0.1-0.2) to the effect that for both pairs of countries most 




We applied Head and Mayer’s methodology for the case of the EU to see how our results 
compared to their findings and also to see if our main conclusions from the previous section 
carry over to the sector level. In our first experiment we took Germany as our benchmark 
country and paired Germany with 3 other EU countries (Spain, UK, and the Netherlands) and 
with a new EU member (Poland). Using as much as possible the Head and Mayer sector 
classification (see Table 4 below) we calculated φtrade for the 4 country pairs for the years 
1985, 1990, 1994 and 1998. For the first 3 years we used World Bank data and for 1998 we 
used the OECD STAN data. Data for Poland were only available for 1990 and 1994. In line 
with the findings by Head and Mayer, the respective values for our φtrade gradually increase 
over time but they remain relatively low.  Only for a few sectors we came up with a φtrade that 
exceeds the break point φ
B
low  in the bell-curve model and φlabmob in the tomahawk case. The 
sectors with agglomeration in some years are clothing, wood, plastics and drugs, ferrous 
metals, and transport. The overall picture is, however, one of a “pre-agglomeration” degree of 
economic integration (results not shown here but available upon request).   
 
Our second experiment was to compute φtrade for the bilateral sector trade between the group 
of 15 EU countries versus the group of 10 accession countries, the new EU members from 
central and eastern Europe. Based on GTAP data for 1997, Table 2 gives the computed free-
                                                 
17 For the data-sets and the actual values used to come up with industry specific measures for the intermediate 
input share, the labour supply elasticity, the share of manufacturing gods in total expenditure, and the 
substitution elasticity for manufactures (a.k.a. the increasing returns parameter) see Head and Mayer (2004a, pp. 
2664-2665).   
  27ness of trade parameter φtrade and compares this implied degree of economic integration with 
the two break-points φ
B
low (equation (8), the bell-curve model) as well as with φlabmob 
(equation (9), the tomahawk model).  The parameter values needed for the derivation of these 
2 break-points for the various manufacturing sectors are taken from Head and Mayer (2004a, 
Appendix). For “non-manufacturing sectors” agriculture, energy and services such a 
theoretical benchmark was not readily available.  
 
For the manufacturing sectors the overall conclusion must be that the degree of economic 
integration for most sectors is such that we are not (yet) in the agglomeration regime. The 
exceptions are (see the scores in bold) Plastics and Drugs, Ferrous Metals, and Vehicles.  
However, even for these 3 sectors the free-ness of trade parameter is such that these sectors 
are only at the start of the upward sloping part of the bell-curve (see the respective φbell-top 
values which gives the peak of the bell-curve for these sectors).
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Table 2 Sector-specific free-ness of trade  
 IOcode        Sector     φtrade   φ
B
low   φ
B
labmob    
 1            Agriculture        0.027    NA    NA 
 2            Energy        0,012    NA    NA 
 3            FoodBevTobacco      0.047    0.46    0.22   
 4            Clothing        0.1355   0.21       0.18 
  5          Wood     0.046   0.39   0.36 
 6      Paper        0.033    0.17    0.16 
 10/8       Plastics and Drugs      0,127   0.109
*   0.104    
 9            Petro          0.017    symm    0.71 
 11          Minerals        0.036    0.47    0.44 
 12        Ferrous metals      0.038   0.0
**   aggl 
 13        Non-ferrous metals      0.029    0.09    0.06 
 14        Fab. Metals        0.050    symm    0.69 
 15/16  Machinery (and Computers)   0.253   0.43   0.36     
 17       Electrical        0.090    0.67    0.39 
 19/20  Ships/railroad/transport
***   0.0112   0.46     0.39 
 21       Vehicles        0.132   0.10
**** 0.08 
 23       Instruments          0.0155   0.57    0.45   
 18       Services         0.162    NA    NA 
* φbell-top=0.545; ** φbell-top=0.50; 
**** φbell-top=0.49 
 
***=based on railroad which has lowest φ
B of these 3 sectors in Head and Mayer, 2004a 
NA=not available; symm= local stability of symmetric equilbria for all values of φ; 
aggl= only full agglomeration stable. 
 
                                                 





low φ φ +
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In our view the results in Table 2 with a free-ness of trade parameter based on bilateral trade 
data on the country level are in line with the conclusions in the previous section based on 
regional data. The bilateral trade data n which Table 2 is based suggest the spatial reach of 
agglomeration forces is probably rather limited.
19  
7 Conclusions  
The estimation of the equilibrium wage equation from a model by Puga (1999) for the EU 
NUTSII regions yielded information on the so called free-ness of trade parameter, the NEG 
variable that stands for the degree of economic integration. The confrontation of the estimated 
free-ness of trade parameter with our two theoretical benchmarks as to the relationship 
between economic integration and agglomeration led us to conclude that the spatial reach of 
agglomeration forces is rather limited. Both in our 2 region setting and multi-regions 
simulations, agglomeration seems to be a rather localized phenomenon. This last conclusion 
was substantiated by free-ness of trade estimations based on bilateral trade data on the EU 
country level. At the same time, we emphasized that the usefulness of the 2 region model and 
its underlying analytics is rather limited when one is dealing with multiple regions like in the 
case of the NUTSII EU regions. We therefore also ran multi-region simulations while taking 
the actual geography of Europe into account.  
 
Where does this leave us? In our view the main findings of this paper are consistent with the 
notion that agglomeration in the EU seems to be most relevant at lower geographical scales. 
Our findings are also in line with related studies like Davis and Weinstein (1999), Forslid et 
al. (2002), Midelfart et al. (2003), Head and Mayer (2004a) and Crozet (2004). The relevance 
of the proximity of agglomeration effects is also underlined by Brülhart, Crozet, and Koenig 
(2004) with respect to the impact of the EU enlargement and its impact on incumbent EU 
regions. In their survey Head and Mayer (2004a) also conclude that it seems that 
agglomeration forces are rather localized.  
 
Finally, and this must be emphasized, even though we have gone at some length to take the 
NEG theory seriously empirically, these are very much preliminary results and these results 
                                                 
￿19 Compared to our calculations for the 3 break points in our 2 region thought experiment in sect ion 5, the 
most notable difference is that in Table 4 φ
B
labmob is on average larger. This is mainly due to the fact that Head 
and Mayer assume that the share of manufactured goods (which in their case refers to the share of the goods 
produced by a specific sector only) is smaller that the benchmark of δ=0.1 that we used in the previous section (a 
lower δ ceteris paribus means weaker agglomeration forces).   
  29point also to the (current) limitations of confronting NEG empirics with NEG theory. How 
should NEG research proceed from here? Clearly, more research is needed in order to tell 
which NEG model is the most relevant at which geographical scale for the EU. As such, our 
results are very much illustrations of the potential empirical relevance of the NEG approach. 
Nevertheless, our main findings are interesting because they constitute, to our knowledge, one 
of the first attempts to confront estimations of the key structural NEG model parameters with 
theoretical NEG predictions as to how changes in the free-ness of trade may impact upon the 
spatial distribution of economic activity. There is much that can be done to improve upon our 
initial findings. In this respect the NEG approach needs to be taken even more seriously. 
Three avenues of research come to mind. The first one is to come up with NEG models that 
incorporate key features like the difference between interregional and international labor 
mobility within a single model (see Behrens et al., 2003, Crozet and Koenig, 2002). This 
might lead to additional testable hypotheses that allow for a better choice between various 
NEG agglomeration mechanisms. The second one is simply to engage in better testing by 
making use of (econometric) insights from outside NEG proper and by making use of new 
(micro) data sets that are increasingly becoming available (Fingleton, 2004, Combes and 
Overman, 2004).  The third, and perhaps most pressing, issue that needs to be taken up in 
future research is the tension between NEG empirics based on multiple regions and large size 
asymmetries on the one hand and the NEG theory where analytical results are too often only 
available for 2 regions on the other hand. Until more progress has been made on this issue, 
numerical simulations will remain a vital (and very useful) element of NEG.    
 
APPENDIX   
Data Description 
Nominal wage is defined as compensation of employees per worker (NUTS 2-level, except 
for Germany –NUTS I). The measure of regional purchasing power is gross value added (all 
sectors). Time series are nominalised by using the GVA-series of Cambridge Econometrics, 
which are denominated in euros of 1995, and the price deflator of national GDP (AMECO-
database).  
In the real market term RMA in the wage equation, we included the NUTS I-regions of EU14 
(=EU15 excluding Luxembourg) + Norway, Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary, Switzerland; .   
For wages we used the EU14 only. All wage, income and production data are taken from The 
European Regional Database (summer 2002 version) from Cambridge Econometrics. 
Distance Drs is in km. 
A set of additional control variables for each NUTS II region that potentially consists of mean 
annual sunshine; mean elevation above sea-level; and dummy variables (country dummy, 
border-region dummy, access to sea dummy, access to navigable waterway dummy). The 
variables mean annual sunshine radiation in kWh/m² (sunshine) and mean elevation above 
  30sea-level (in metres) are taken from the SPESP database (see 
http://www.mcrit.com/SPESP/SPESP_reg_ind_final%20report.htm ). 
 
How to Approximate the Price Index I? 
For the model without intermediate inputs (μ=0), we proceeded as follows. For each region 
we focus on two prices: the price in district r of a manufactured good produced in district r 
and the average price outside district r of a manufactured good produced outside district r. 
The determination of the simplified local price index for manufactures requires a measure of 
distance between region r and the regions outside. The distance from the economic center is 
an appropriate measure in our view. This center is obtained by weighing the distances with 
relative Y. Here we make use of the estimation results based for a simple market-potential 
function for our sample of EU NUTSII regions. Regions with largest market-potential MP, see 










Table A1   Regions with largest Market Potential, 1995 data (in descending order of market potential) 
1995  κ2= .007  20 Zeeland 
1  Nordrhein-Westfalen  21  Nord-Pas de Calais 
2 Limburg  22  Saarland 
3 Limburg(B)  23  Luxembourg(B) 
4 Luik  24  West-Vlaanderen 
5 Noord-Brabant  25  Picardie 
6 Vlaams-Brabant  26  Champagne-Ard. 
7 Baden-Württemberg  27  Alsace 
8 Rheinland-Pfalz  28  Noord-Holland 
9 Gelderland  29  Overijssel 
10 Antwerpen  30  Flevoland 
11 Waals-Brabant 31  Niedersachsen 
12 Brussel  32  Lorraine 
13 Namen  33  Vorarlberg 
14 Utrecht  34  Ostschweiz 
15  Ile de France  35  Zurich 
16 Oost-Vlaanderen  36  N_W  Schweiz 
17 Hainaut  37  London 
18 Bayern  38  Kent 
19 Zuid-Holland  39  Zentralschweiz 
 
The distance between a region r and the nearest center region (out of the list of the 35 regions 
with the largest MP for the NUTSII regions, see Table A1) gives us Tr, center in the equation 
below: 
   () () []
ε ε ε λ λ




1 1 center r r r r r r T W W I , 
where  r W  is the average wage outside district r, and weight λr is region r’s share of 
employment in manufacturing, which is proportional to the number of varieties of 
manufactures (λ is proxied by (regional employment) / (EU+employment)). 
  
For the model with intermediate inputs this “trick” to approximate the price index, now the 
price index for intermediates, would not do as easily. The reason is that the equilibrium price 
index is now not only a function of wages but also of itself:   
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This follows directly from the fact that we now have two factors of production (labour and the 











As a result the equilibrium price index, the summation of the price each firm charges 
corrected for distance (the suppliers access variable), is a function of both the wage W and the 
price index I. 
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